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Latin American governnents have followed with interest the operations 
of the European Payments Union. Shortly after its creation in July 1950, 
Latin American representatives attending the annual meeting of the 
International Monetary Fund in Paris discussed infonnally among themselves 
the repercussions which EPU might have for the trade of this region. The 
matter was further considered at the Mexico meeting of the Commission in 
June 1951 and again by the ECLA Committee of the Whole in Santiago in 
February 1952. 
It is understandable that Latin American countries should wish to 
explore every possibility for retoring multilateral trade with European 
countries. While the causes of stagnation of trade with Europe are of a 
more fundamental character, as may be seen in the Study of Trade between 
Latin America and Europe, a solution of the payments problem, enabling 
Latin American countries to transfer their balances from one European 
country to another, is nevertheless a prerequisite to an expansion of 
trade based on favourable economic and physical conditions. 
Moreover, Latin American countries, the bulk of whose exports 
cojisist of a few basic commodities, have great difficulty in adjusting 
their import requirements so that they offset exaatly in value the needs 
/of each tv&dirjs 
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of each trading partner for such commodities. 
When the Committee of the Whole requested that the "study of 
implications of the EPU for Latin America11 be given a high priority, 
it was decided to obtain the services of a consultant to make a 
preliminary investigation of the problem. Professor Robert Triffin who 
had been closely identified with the studies and negotiations that led 
to the EPU Agreement, accepted an assignment for this task. 
The paper of Professor Triffin, which was written after he had 
studied and explored the question with officials of EPU, is. submitted 
under his own responsibility. 
We believe that this report by Professor Triffin provides an 
adequate basis for a preliminary discussion,of this subject and that 
from this discussion we may see how to proceed with further studies. 
Meanwhile, to go more deeply into the problem in our discussions, with 
a view to arriving at a practical solution, would seem premature. It 
is essential that more detailed information should first be available 
regarding the flow of payments between each of the Latin countries and 
members of the European Payments Union. Apart from other important 
aspects, without such information it would be impossible to evaluate 
the effects of the formula of partial payment in gold or dollars, which 
Professor Triffin suggests could in certain cases facilitate multilateral 
compensation of Latin American balances through the mechanism of the 
European Payments Union. Moreover, it is well known that at the present 
time the problem of convertibility is being discussed again on a wider 
basis than that of the Payments Union* It might perhaps prove useful to 
observe the course of events before formulating any conclusions, from the 
Latin American standpoint. 
Consequently, the Executive Secretary has limited himself, at this 
stage, t© submitting Professor Triffin?s interesting document in the hope 
that at the Fifth Session the necessary instructions may be given to 
proceed with this work, should the Governments dean it advisable» 
If these studies were to be pursued, they could examine monetary 
and trade policies and the influence which a multilateral clearing system 
might have in liberalizing trade« In order to make an exhaustive analysis 




with their trading partners in Europe, it would be necessary as pointed 
out above, -to obtain complete information on trade agreements and balances 
in the corresponding individual accounts. 
Lastly, it should be pointed out that by positing a hypothetical 
scheme this document makes it possibly to better understand the technical 
limitations and difficulties — as well as the advantages and disadvantages — 
of any attempt to effect multilateral ^ settlements through the facilities of 
EPU. In this connection, it should be emphasized that in no way does this 
paper suggest a specific proposal for the consideration of the Commission. 






POSSIBILITY OF EFFECTING MULTILATERAL COMPENSATION SETTLEMENTS 
BETWEEN LATIN AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THROUGH THE 
EUROPEAN PAYMENTS UNION 
by Robert Triffin 
1« Introduction 
1# insufficient attention has tteennpaid recently, either in Europe or 
Latin America, to the striking deterioration which has taken place since 
the war in the mutual trade relations of these two areas. Economic policy 
in Europe has concentrated essentially on post-war reconstruction, and in 
Latin America on the problems of inflation and economic development * And 
yet a return to a more balanced trade and payments pattern will certainly 
require a close study of the trade pattern which has emerged since the 
war* 
Before the upheavals created by two world wars and the world economic 
crisis of the thirties, Europe had long been the main supplier and the 
best customer of Latin American countries, her share of both Latin 
American imports and exports being considerably more than twice that 
of the United States and Canada» This ratio declined only slightly, 
as far as Latin American exports are concerned, in the inter war period, 
but fell drastically after the second world war, from more than 200 per 
cent in 1938 to about 65 per cent in 1950 and 1951. The displacement of 
Europe by the U. S. and Canada as a supplier of Latin America has been 
etfjen greater, although mòre gradual. From 250 to 275 per cent in pré-
World.War I, the ratio fell to little mòre than 100 pqr cent in the inter-
war-period, and to about 50 per cent in 1950 and 1951. 
/2„ The factors 
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2, The factors underlying these developments are numerous and varied: 
the interruption of trade during the two world wars, the growing 
industrialisation of Latin America, the decline in Argentine e:xports of 
primary products, the efforts of European countries to develop substitute 
sources of imports in their overseas territories or associated areas, etc* 
Some of these trends may be reversed, while others should require more 
flexible adaptation in the structure 6f trade in order to maintain its 
volume to the desirable level0 1/ 
Another powerful deterrent to propel trade relations, of particular 
importance since the early thirties and even more today, is the breakdown 
of the system oi international settlements and its degeneration into a 
bilateral system of payments between each country and each one of its 
trade partners• We shall here limit ourselves to this aspect of the 
problem, in an attempt to analyse its causes, and to seek some 
constructive remedies, both in the short-run and in the long-run» 
3* Contrary to some prevailing views,, this bilateral trend pervades 
not only the trade relations conducted under bilateral payment agreements, 
but also those now conducted in dollars with the northern group of Latin 
American countries. In the first case, normal trade relations are 
obviously impeded by the unwillingness of the surplus country to accumulate 
large credit balances in inconvertible currencies. In the second case, 
multilateralism is formally preserved, but narrowly limited, in substance 
by the unwilligness of the deficit country to accumulate large debts 
payable in scarce gold or dollars. 
It is particularly important to note that these deterrents apply-
not only to overall creditors or debtors, but also to countries which 
would themselves be in overall equilibrium if they could mobilise their 
1/ For an analysis of the factors that have contributed to deterioration 
of European-Latin American trade^  see A Study of Trade between Latin 
Latin America and Europe, prepared by the EGLA7ECE/FA0 Secretariats 
(United Nations Sales No# 1952*II.G#2.)0 • . ' ' 
/bilateral earnings 
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bilateral earnings to settle their bilateral deficits in a multilateral 
network of world trade. Such countries are now faced with the alternative 
of: 
a) either financing themselves their bilateral surpluses by accepting 
inconvertible payments; in which case they must discriminate in their 
import policies in order4 to shift imports from their normal sources of 
supply to the countries whose currency they are accumulating; 
b) or accept a contraction of their normal export markets by insisting 
on gold or dollar payments which the buying countries are unable to provide. 
The second alternative will lead to a greater contraction of trade, 
while the first will avoid — in part — such a contraction, but at the 
cost of a more and more uneconomic pattern of trade and a reduction in 
productivity and real income * 
Um The only ideal remedy, in such a situation, lies in the hands of the 
overall surplus and deficit countries. The overall surplus countries 
should follow more liberal commercial policies, and until their 
resources are fully employed — adopt expansionary policies domestically 
and promote capital exports, both private and;official. The overall 
deficit countries, on the other hand, should make the fullest use of 
their own resources, facilitate capital imports or borrowings, if 
economically justified and feasible, and reduce simultaneously their own 
consumption scad investment to the levels permitted by their own maximum 
production supplemented by such aid or capital receipts from the surplus 
countries. In some cases, the reconciliation between full employment 
policies and overall balance of payments equilibrium — given the level 
of international lending — may call for exchange of price readjustments. 
The point is, however, that these traditional readjustment policies 
can only be carried out by the overall creditors or debtors, and should 
involve action by the first as well as by the latter. Final readjustments 
of these overall unbalances cannot be avoided anyway. The deficit countries 
will be unable to maintain indefinitely such deficits if their creditors 
refuse to finance them, and the disappearance of the deficits will, of 
course, eliminate the corresponding surpluses of the creditors. In the 
absence of the conscious readjustment policies indicated above, however, 
this will involve an overall contraction of trade — involving other 
/countries as well 
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countries as well — to the lowest level compatible with the international 
expenditure of the extreme creditor country. It is to guard against this 
danger that the I. M. F„ Charter foresaw the application of systematic 
discrimination against the exports of a "scarce currency11 country» 
In fact, however, the broader latitude left to members under Article 
XIV temporarily to retain and adjust at will their exchange controls to r 
changing circumstances, resulted in a wide extension of discriminatory 
techniques, as a bargaining weapon in commercial policies, far beyond their 
justifiable-field of application. The result was the use of exchange and 
import controls by balanced, or even, surplus countries as well as by 
deficit countries and, even more important, the recourse to discriminatory 
controls not only against scarce currencies, but against soft currency 
countries as well. 
5. Generalised bilateralism was the inevitable consequence of the 
situation described above, but elicited a growing resistance and increasing 
efforts to restore aminimum of multilateralism in trade and payments. 
The sterling area succeeded from the start in eschewing such 
bilateralism among its members and maintained some degree of transferability 
even in its trade with non-4iembers# The 0. E. E* C0 countries, after 
several years of discussion and efforts, have also succeeded in 
establishing through E. P. U. an effective system of multilateral 
settlements covering not only western Europe, but also its overseas 
territories and associated monetaiy areas, including the whole sterling 
area itself. On the other hand, trade and payments between E# P. U. 
countries and other countries, particularly in Latin America, remain 
subject to the same bilateral shackles as before; Can anything be done 
to remove these obstacles and facilitate both trade expansion and trade 
multilateralism between E. .P# U. members and the various countries of Latin 
America? 
II» Outline of 
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II, Outline of Possible Solutions 
6» Ideally, the best approach to the problem lies in the restoration of 
full, world-wide multilateralism along the lines indicated above (paragraph 
4) and under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund, One of the 
primary objectives of the Fund is indeed "to assist in the establishment 
of a multilateral system of payments in respect of current transactions 
between members , (Article I, iv), This objective is implemented by 
Article VIII, section which obligates each Fund member to maintain the 
convertibility of its currency with respect of current transactions. This 
obligation, however, is still in abeyance under the transitional provisions 
of Article XIV, and might occasionally be waived even later under Section 
2 of Article VIII. 
Specific provision is not made in the Articles of Agreement to guard 
effectively against the spread of bilateralism which will normally flow, 
from the inconvertibility of any major currency. Negotiations among 
members will be necessary to preserve, in such cases, the maximum 
transferability among members of the Fund, Various proposals have recently 
been made in this respect, in order to facilitate for each country the 
mobilization of its bilateral earnings necessary to provide it with the 
currencies needed to cover its bilateral deficits. What is basically-
involved is the right for any member to exchange in the Fund the currencies 
which it earns for the currencies which it needs in its international 
transactions. Such clearing operations could be made fully automatic if 
they did not, in practice, involve any granting of credit to persistent 
debtors and any continuous drain on the Fund's holdings of the currencies 
of extreme creditors. 
The problem does not arise with respect to the country requesting 
the transaction, since the latter involves only a mobilization of earnings 
and not the financing of an overall deficit. If, however, the broad 
pattern' of international trade and payments remains as far from equilibrium 
as it is today, the cumulative effect of such clearing operations would 
be a growing accumulation by the Fund of the currencies of the countries 
in persistent overall deficit tantamount to the financing of such 
deficits — and a corresponding depletion of the Fund's assets in the 
/currencies of 
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currencies of persistent creditor nations * The currencies of persistent 
creditors or debtors must therefore be unavoidably excluded from any 
automatic clearing mechanism until the respective countries have agreed 
with the Fund on the corrective policies required to readjust their overall 
position. The maintenance of clearing facilities for all other currencies 
would, however, avoid bilateralism and preserve the maximum of transferability, 
multilateralism and competition compatible with existing disequilibria in 
world trade. The exclusion of "scarce" and "surplus" currencies from such 
facilities would, moreover, give the Fundus advice a maximum of leverage 
on persistent creditors and debtors to readjust their monetaiy and 
commercial policies —. including exchange rates and exchange controls — 
in the direction needed to promote better international balance. 
The speeches of the British, the French and the Italian Governors at 
the September Meeting of the Fund in Mexico City indicate considerable 
support for this type of approach# It would, however, require some radical 
shifts in the present policies of the Fund and either an outright revision, 
or a. rather flexible ^ interpretation, of some legal provisions in the 
Articles of Agreement, This might possibly be done by stages, beginning 
for instance with the quasiautomatic acceptance by the Fund of any proposed 
transaction the effect of which does not aggravate imbalance in the FundTs 
relative holdings of its members* currencies• For significant progress to 
be achieved, however, much more will be necessary, and will require agreement 
among a very large number of countries. In the meantime, some steps could 
be taken without delay toward this ultimate objective by building up on 
already existing commitments and mechanisms organizing currency 
transferability, on a regional basis» The gradual broadening of such 
arrangements wpuld, in the end, lead to the same result of restoring 
convertibility over, the widest possible area, with temporary exception for 
only the currencies of extreme creditors and debtors. 
7* Three possible escapes from bilateralism offer themselves in this 
direction, ..The best choice between them may differ for different countries, 
depending on the precise nature of their actual trade and payments problems« 
/The first approach 
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The first approach is through the exclusive use of gold or the UtS# 
dollar in a country's international settlements. If export earnings are 
accumulated in gold or U, S. dollars, they will provide facilities which 
can, in practice, be used with any and all other countries for the 
settlement of bilateral deficits. This paramount advantage, however, is 
offset in part, or more than offset, by the consequent trade and exchange 
restrictions which many countries will'place on the exports of countries 
which trade only on a dollar basis. This solution, therefore, will appeal 
mostly to countries whose exports do not depend to any large extent on 
European or sterling area outlets, or consist mostly in essential goods 
unavailable from other sources. It may also be unescapable for a country 
which would find great difficulties in making use of its earnings in 
sterling or E. P, U. currencies, if it accepted such currencies in payment 
for its exports. 
The Caribbean area has generally tended toward such a position, but 
some countries, such as Colombia and, recently, Cuba have concluded limited 
payment agreements when this became necessary to protect their export 
outlets in Europe, The fact that such agreements had often to be concluded 
on a purely bilateral basis, however, made them far less attractive than 
would be the case if some degree of transferability could be introduced in 
the arrangements, 
30 The second most feasible approach would be for a Latin American country 
to join the sterling transferable account area, thus ensuring a high degree 
of transferability for the sterling earnings accepted by it in settlement 
of its surpluses. Such a solution would be particularly attractive to 
countries which depend primarily on sterling area outlets for their exports, 
and which can most easily use such sterling earnings for purchases or 
payments in other countries which are a party to such arrangements• Even 
then, however, difficulties may.be encountered in some cases in negotiating 
their admission to the transferable account area, and they may have to be 
content with "administrative" transferability, requiring U.K. authorization 
for specific transactions, 
/Moreover, several 
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Moreover, several important EFU countries have so far refused to enter 
the transferable account area. Latin American sterling earnings could not, 
therefore; be spent automatically to settle deficits with Belgium, France, 
or Switzerland, for instance. Still, there are reasons to believe that 
some degree of success could be achieved by a general negotiation designed: 
a) to give some Latin American countries acqess to the transferable . 
account group; and 
b) to allow sterling settlement between such countries and most <—• if 
not all — of the EPU countries. 
9# The third possibility is to seek transferability through regional 
multilateral agreements, such as the European Payments Union« Full . 
participation in EFJ clearings would ensure full transferability of 
earnings over a very wide area, including not only OEEC countries, but the 
whole sterling area as well© We shall examine more in detail, in the 
following section, the difficulties that stand in the way of such an 
arrangement, and some of the alternative techniques which might be explored 
in order to overcome them. 
The conclusion of a Latin American Payments Union would hardly be 
practicable at this stage, and would be of little value in itself in view 
of the scant trade relations now existing, or likely to develop, among. 
Latin American countries themselves* Latin American transferability might, 
however, become far more important in connection with European settlements 
themselves, and some suggestions will also be made in this respect in the 
latter part of this paper. 
III. Transferability through EPU 
10, In view of its broader scope and advantages, transferability via EPU 
deserves particular study, pending the even broader and more radical 
solution of the problem through the redirection of IMF policies and 
operations. 
The first idea that springs to mind in this respect wculd be the 
possibility for all or any Latin American countries to join EPU as full 
members® This, however, does not constitute, at the moment, a practical 
and feasible solution. The EPU mechanism combines clearing operations 
/proper with the 
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proper with the automatic granting of credits among members and with 
close consultation and cry-operation on many phases of commercial, economic, 
fiscal, and monetary policies. This presupposes a degree of interdependence 
which is entirely lacking among such countries as, e»g0, Switzerland and 
Honduras, or even Mexico and Paraguay, It might not even be desirable 
were it possible to extend the field of consultation, negotiation and 
hannonisation of policies over such a large and heterogeneous area, whose 
interests may be widely different without necessarily entering into conflict 
with one another, 
A less ambitious, but more practicable, solution would be to extend to 
Latin American countries some or all — of the facilities offered by the 
EPU clearing system, without involving them, however, in the other aspects 
of the EPU and OEEC arrangements. They would not participate —> neither as 
borrowers nor as lenders — in the credit machinery of EPU. Nor would they 
participate in the management of EPU or OEEC. Latin American membership in 
EPU would be as undesirable theoretically as it is impossible in practice. 
It would, moreover, conflict directly with the commitments of both 
European and Latin American countries toward the International Monetary 
Fund and GATT. 
11, The following exploration of possible solutions is therefore strictly 
limited to: the participation of Latin American countries in the compensation 
machinery of EPU, That is to say, each Latin American country would be 
enabled to use its earnings in any one European currency to settle its 
deficits with any one European country, in a truly triangular, and indeed 
multilateral, manner, as was the case before the breakdown of the gold 
standard, • In-the absence of such compensation machinery, a Latin American 
country may be forced to pay gold or dollars to settle its deficits with 
country A, while being forced at the same time to accumulate frozen credits 
on country B. In practice, being both unable to pay gold, and unwilling to 
accumulate bilateral credits on a large scale, the country is forced to 
limit severely both its imports from country A and its exports to country 
B, It may also, in'part, try and shift its imports — through bilateral 
discrimination — from its most normal and economic sources of supply 
toward the countries on which it is accumulating bilateral claims, and 
this in spite of-higher cofets, lower quality, or lesser essentiality of 
the imports available from'these latter countries, 
/The loss is 
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Thé loss is therefore a double one: 
a) an actual Restriction of the volume of trade, and the abandonment 
of profitable lines of production for exportj 
. b) increased costs of imports, and unwanted shifts from wanted to . 
. -c ' . . 
unwanted import lines. 
12t Access to the EFU clearing facilities would therefore be of substantial 
benefit .to many Latin American countries, and particularly to those which 
seek an expansion of their exports to Europe and could make a more 
economical use of their export earnings ii? they were able to usé them ift 
any EPU country or associated area — including norwnember sterling 
countries instead of being forced to use them bilaterally in the 
countriës in which they sell. Many difficulties arise, however, from the 
fact that the net monthly balances of European countries in EPU are subject 
to different rates of gold and credit settlement, depending on their 
cumulative surplusés or deficits with the organization. An EPU creditor 
may -not want to increase its lending to EPU in order to finance Latin 
American purchases in another country. Extreme EPU debtors might similarly 
object to settling 100$ in gold to EPU their deficit with a Latin American . 
country. Finally, EPU itself would suffer a loss in its convertible assets 
whenever a Latin American country used its earnings.on a .country subject to 
low gold settlanents, to effect payment to a country entitled to large 
goId settlements. 
These difficulties; could be overcome to everyoneTs benefit, but only 
» • after careful study and negotiation on the part of the various countries 
» 
involved, in order to determine th-3 advantages and disadvantages of the 
arrangement for each participant and to ensure for each a net favourable 
balance of the first over ihe latter. 
.This is the reason why the first step taken last summer, as a result 
of explorations with EPU, was a very modest one, European countries were . 
not requested to agree to any automatic compensation involving their Latin 
American accounts, nor even to indicate the current status of such accounts. 
They undertook, however, to report monthly any decrease (or increase) of 
claim (or debt) with individual Latin American countries which they would 
be willing to compensate against an equivalent decrease (or increase) of 
their EPU position. In pràôtice, no actual operation would.be likely to 
/become possible 
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become possible under this system unless both of the following conditions 
could be fulfilled: 
a) two .European countries .must propose simultaneously opposite.(and 
therefore mutually offsetting) operations with the same Latin American 
country; 
b) the Latin American country involved must agree to the consequent 
shift of its claim (or debt) from one European country to the other. 
To take a hypothetical example from Annex I, a Uruguayan debt to France 
could be offset" against a Uruguayan claim on Switzerland if all three 
countries agreed to such a transaction. 
This procedure, initiated in October 1952, has given very meager 
results so far. Only a very few transactions, for a total amount of about 
$L million, were reported during the first four months. This was to be 
expected, for the following reasons: 
a) the use of sterling balances in automatic or administrative 
transfers is regulated by the very different arrangements concluded 
between the UK and its various trade partners, both in Europe and in 
Latin America; 
b) unanimous agreement between all interested parties would be 
necessary for the implementation of any proposed compensation. Experience 
shows, however, that such unanimous agreement is extremely rare. Country 
A might be extremely interested in compensation 1, but Country 0 might 
have no interest in it. Country B may be greatly interested in compensation 
2, which presents no interest for country A. Both operations will 
therefore be rejected unless an organic link is established between them, 
inducing country B to accept, compensation 1 in order to obtain the 
agreement of country A to compensation 2. 
c) the scope for compensations has been particularly unfavourable 
during this period because of the exceptional deficits accumulated by 
Argentina and Brazil towards most of their trade partners in Europe. 
Such a situation cannot last, but limits severely as of now the real 
possibilities of compensations. 
/13» The scope 
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13 • The scope of voluntary compensations may increase somewhat as Latin 
American countries — and particularly Brazil and Argentina — make 
further progress toward overall balance in their international transactions. 
On the whole, however, large 'scale compensations could result only.from 
an . organic and automatic system under which all EPU members would accept 
in advance: 
a) all proposed compensations the net impact of which, when taken 
together rather than one by one, does not increase their imbalance in 
EPU; or, better still, 
b) all proposed compensations provided that some method be found to 
offset any net unfavourable impact that they might have on the position 
of a particular member in EPU« 
14« The first possibility could be implemented very easily by a special 
agreement between some — or all — EPtJ members and some — or all —> 
Latin American countries: 
(1) Any Latin American participant would be allowed to transfer to 
EPU its claims on any EPU participant which'is in a cumulative surplus 
position in EPU, and be credited in exchange in a special "Latin American 
EPU account." The EPU member would be relieved of its debt to the Latin 
American participant against a corresponding debit in its EPU accounting 
surplus; 
(2) Any EPU member whose accounting surplus' has been reduced under 
provision (l) above, will accept automatically to cancel its claims on 
any Latin American participants, in the same or in following accounting 
periods, against corresponding credits to its accounting surplus, up to 
the total amount of reductions effected under (l); 
(3) Any EPU participant which is in a cumulative debit position with 
EPU will accept automatically to cancel its claims on any Latin American 
participants, against corresponding credits to its accounting position in 
EPU; 
/ (4). Any EPU 
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(4») Any EPU member whose accounting deficit has been reduced' 
under provision (3) above will accept automatically to have it 
increased, in the. same or in following accounting periods, against 
cancellation of its debts to Latin American participants,.up to the 
total amount of reductions effected under (3); 
(5.) Latin American participants could, therefore, acquire special 
"Latin American EPU accounts" by transferring to EPU their claims on:. 
a) any EPU participant which is in a cumulative surplus., 
position in EPU; 
b) any EPU participant which is in a. cumulative deficit 
position in EPU, up to the total amount of reductions . 
effected under (3) above; 
(6.) These special "Latin American EPU accounts" could be drawn 
.upon.by any Latin American participant to discharge a debt owed to: 
a) any EPU participart which is in a cumulative debit 
position in EPU; 
b) a.ny EPU participant which is in a cumulative surplus 
position in EPU, up to the-total amount of reductions 
effected under (l) above; 
(7.) Any Latin American participant will be allowed to transfer 
freely to any othér Latin American participant all or part of the 
creditor balance of its special Latin American EPU account; 
(8é) In the event of a termination of EPU or of such special 
agreement as might be entered into between Latin American countries 
and EPU, the "Latin American EPU accounts" would be liquidated, and 
.all EPU obligations to Latin American participants cancelled, through 
the retransfer to the Latin American holders of the unused residual 
balances initially transferred by"them tovEPU# 
/l5o In order to 
E/CN02/299-
Page 14 
15* In order to maximize compensations under this method, Latin American 
participantB would agree among themselves to transfer to EPU all their 
claims on EPU creditors in accordance with 14 (l) and (5a) above, and to 
discharge all their debts to EPU debtors in accordance with 14 (3) and 
(6a) above, insofar as much operations would not increase their special 
account balance, or deplete it unduly, after taking into account all 
possibilities for transfers under 14 (?)• 
16, These automatic commitments could be expanded further through 
discretionary operations. For instance, an EPU participant might accept 
to have its accounting deficit or surplus in EPU increased up to a given 
amount —. as well as decreased — as a result of corresponding 
cancellations of debts and surpluses to Latin American participants, 
accompanied by equivalent increases in the Latin American countries* 
special accounts with EPU» Such transactions would, however, increase 
the imbalance of European members in EPU, and tend to paralyze the use 
of quotas;• This would be of concern to all EPU members, and the approval 
of the Managing Board should probably be required in these cases. 
17. In order to give maximum scope to these operations, however, a method 
should be found to enable Latin American countries automatically to use 
their earnings on EPU debtors as well as creditors, to pay EPU creditors 
as well as debtors» The negotiation of an agreement along these lines 
woiald, of necessity, involve a commitment to compensate —» at least in 
part —« the net unfavourable impact of such transactions upon the members* 
position. The added deficits of the debtors in EPU and the added 
surpluses of the creditors in EPU will give rise to additional settlements 
which it would be very difficult to.channel into the normal quotas of 
these countries in EPU. This is because: 
a) the debtors will be reluctant to expose themselves to the higher 
rates of gold payments (up to 100 per cent) stipulated in the EPU Agreement 
when their cumulative deficit in EPU increases; 
b) the creditors may 
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b) the creditors may be reluctant to grant the same credits for 
their Latin American surpluses as for their European surpluses without 
getting in exchange the trade commitments (gradual elimination of 
restrictions on their exports) which are the counterpart of their EPU 
credit commitments; 
c) EPU members in general will resist the use — and eventual 
depletion -- of quota facilities for the financing of Latin American 
rather than intra-EPU trade. 
18, Some reconciliation of the conflicting interests at stake might, 
however, be negotiated by the interested parties: 
a) the creditor countries may accept some addition to their regular 
EPU quota, for the settlement of their Latin American surpluses via the 
special Latin American EPU accounts mentioned above. There is little 
doubt, however,' that they will make this conditional upon a higher ratio 
of gold settlement — and a lower ratio of credit settlement — than 
provided in the EPU Agreement itself; 
b) the debtor countries may similarly accept to make some fractional 
gold settlements outside their regular quotas, on their debts to Latin 
American countries transferred to the special Latin American EPU accounts 
of these countries; 
c) the size of these additional quotas, and the exact ratio of gold 
settlements, would certainly require much bargaining and negotiation 
between creditors and debtors; it is most unlikely that the gold 
settlement ratios offered by debtors will be high enough to meet the 
creditors1 claims; 
d) in order to bridge this probable gap between the gold ratio 
acceptable to creditors and the gold ratio acceptable to debtors, some 
fractional gold settlements might be instilled in the machinery of the 
Latin American EPU accounts. It is extremely difficult to discuss 
concrete situations in this respect in the abstract, and in advance of 
actual negotiations. The attempt to do so, in the following paragraphs, 
should therefore be regarded as an illustrative example, and not as an 
/actual proposal, 
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actual proposal, of how a concrete scheme might function. 
19 • Latin American EPU accounts could be acquired by a Latin American 
country: 
a) against equivalent transfers of claims on any EPU creditor country; . 
or 
b) against equivalent transfers of claims on any EPU debtor country, 
only insofar as the resulting deterioration of that countryTs positon in 
EPU is offset by reverse operations, as outlined in paragraph 14 above; or 
c) against simultaneous transfers of gold or U.S. dollars and claims 
on EPU debtor countries outside provision (b) above, in the proportion 
25 per cent gold or U.S. dollars and 75 per cent claims. 
20. These accounts could be drawn upon to settle deficits anywhere in the 
EPU area: 
a.) in full for payments to any EPU debtor country; 
b) in full for payments to any EPU creditor country, only insofar as 
the resulting increase in that count ryfs accounting surplus in EPU is 
offset by reverse operations, as outlined in paragraph 14 above; 
c) for 1 % of the amount to be paid to any EPU creditor country not 
falling under provision (b) above, provided that the ranaining- 25 per cent 
be covered by simultaneous payment in gold or U.S. dollars. 
21. Settlements between EPU and its own members, arising from these 
operations would take the following forai: 
a) through the regular EPU quota rules and the application of thè 
cumulative Drincipal insofar as settlements are made under provisions 
19 (a) and (b), and 20 (a) and (b) above; 
b); outside the EPU quotas, in cases falling-under 19 (c) and 20 (c) 
above, with gold payments of 35 per cent by debtors, and 70 per cent to 
creditors, these ratios to be readjusted every six months — with 
retroactive effect — with a view to eliminate any permanent impact — ' 
favourable or unfavourable — of such operations on EPUfs convertible assets# 
22. A simplified example will illustrate the mechanical arrangements 
involved in EPU: 
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Let us assume that Argentina has accumulated 
1« a claim of $20 million on an EPU creditor 
country (Italy) and a claim of $18 million on 
an EPU debtor country (Norway) 
2# a debt of $12 million to an EPU debtor country 
(France) and a debt of $16 million to an EPU 
creditor country (Germany) 
Argentina could use any credits in its special EPU account 
to discharge its debts to France and Germany 
1. in the case of France, on a full, clearing basis, 
by drawing the $12 million due from its special 
EPU account 
2« in the case of Germany, by a 25 per cent gold or 
dollar payment ($4 million), and a 75 per cent 
drawing on its account ($12 million) 
In order to build up. its EFU account to the required 
amount ($12 million * $12 million » $24 million), 
Argentina would: 
1* pay into this account its $20 million claim on 
Italy, and receive an equivalent credit of $20 
million 
2« complete the $24 million needed by paying into 
the account 25 per cent ($1 million) in gold or 
dollars, and 75 per cent ($3 million) in claims 
on Norway 
The final result for Argentina would be; 
a total gold payment of $5 million 
2» the total extinction of its debts ($28 million) 
to France and Germany 
3« the total extinction of its claim on Italy 
($20 million), and the partial amortization 
($3 million) of. its claim on Norway 
/4# a residual 
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4. a residual claim of $15. million on Norway 
e) The results for the four European countries involved 
would be; 
lm for Norway, a payment of about $1 million 
(35 per cent) in gold and a debt of $2 million 
to the ERJ Latin American account 
2. for France, a reduction of $12 million in its 
regular ERJ deficit, involving in this case a 
$12 million gold repayment to France, which is 
now beyond its quota (in.the 100 per cent gold 
tranche) in its EPU transactions 
3» for Italy, a reduction of $20 million in its 
cumulative EPU surplus, involving in this case 
a $10 million gold repayment to EPU (because 
its surplus in the EPU account exceeds by at 
least 20 per cent its quota), and a $10 million 
amortization of its EPU creditor position 
4* for Germany, a claim of $4»8 million (30 per 
cent) on the EPU Latin American account, and, a 
gold receipt of $11.2 million (70 per cent) from 
EPU 
f) In this particular example, the $5 million paid in by Argentina 
would not compensate the excess of outpayments by EPU ($12 
million to France, and $11®2 million tp Germany) oyer receipts 
($10 million from Italy and $1 million from Norway)» There 
would be a net drop of $7*2 million in EPU1 s convertible 
assets. This, however, should not cause particular çoncern 
since it would be the direct consequence of a substantial 
reduction in the cumulative surplus position of Italy and 
the extreme deficit position of France. 
23« The arrangement outlined above would be open to all Latin American 




among the participants,— other countries remaining unaffected as soon 
as they agree .that, a sufficient number of countries have acceded to it to 
make it workable in'practice. . . 
The arrangement would be re-examined after one year*s e^ qperience, in 
order to, amend it in the light of. this experience. This revision would 
apply particularly to the size of the. special quotas and the ratios of 
gold settlement applicable to EPU members and Latin American countries 
with respect to the clearing operations between EHJ and Latin-American 
participants. 
24. It is important to note that the operations contemplated above would 
always tend to decrease —? and. never to increase • — the credit or debit 
balance of an EFU member toward a Latin American member. On the other 
hand, they might increase as . well as decrease the credit or debit balance 
of an EPU member with EHJ itself.. This solution therefore combines 
automatic firstr^ategory. qompensatioris among all members with automatic 
second-category compensations among EPU. members only. - .The well known 
objections to second-category compensations — shifts of debtors and: 
creditors —« would make, them impossible as far as Latin American countries 
are concerned, but. are overcome between EFU members by the system of joint 
guarantees implicit in the liquidation provisions of the EFU agreement.^ 
25. It cannot be denied, however, that a number ¿.of difficulties remain 
unsolved,, and may deter some countries from apcepting the above arrangements? 
a) The obligation for Latin American countries to accompany 
with fractional gold or dollar, settlements their use of balances 
on EPU debtors to.pay EPU creditors is obviously a burdensome one. 
On the other hand, in the absence of transferability, they may be 
forced now to malce full dollar payments to their European creditors, 
and to accumulate frozen credits on their debtors or to shift their 
l/ A similar system of, joint guarantees.among the Latin American countries 
themselves would be most unlikely to be accepted by them. Mexico, for 
instance, would hardly accept to guarantee the'debts of Paraguay or 
Bolivia with which it has* nonsignificant trade or economic relations• 
/imports from 
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imports from cheaper to more expensive supply sources and to decrease 
exports to their best and more normal markets. The proposed system 
would be clearly unfavourable only if a Latin American country could 
otherwise obtain large credits from its European creditors while 
getting at the same time substantial dollar payments from its debtors. 
There exist very few, if any, cases of this sort, but some countries 
which are extremely short of dollars may still wish to cling to 
bilateralism and discrimination, whatever their costs, as an easier 
way out of their present difficulties» On the whole, however, it 
seems that the above suggestions should be well received by the. 
Southern countries who conduct most of their trade under payment 
agreements• 
b) The obligation to make fractional dollar payments is, of 
course, no burden for those countries which already conduct all 
their trade in dollars. On the contrary, the opportunities thus 
opened for triangular settlements via EPU may help maintain or 
expand their markets with their EPU debtors who now restrict their 
purchases because they are forced to make bilateral dollar payments. 
This favourable effect would be accentuated further if,.instead of 
claiming full dollar settlements for its uncompensated surpluses, 
the Latin American creditor could transfer them in part to other 
Latin American countries which need them for settlements in Europe. 
c) The agreement would, of course, remain unoperative ~ but 
not damaging — for a Latin American country which is either in 
deficit or in surplus with every single European country. Such a 
situation would, in any case, be most unlikely to prove a maintainable 
and durable one. 
d) The most serious objections are likely to come from Europe 
rather than from Latin America. 
First of all, countries which now obtain large credits in Latin 
America under'payment agreements will be reluctant to see these 
compensated against their EPU position, especially if this involves 
the risk of substantial gold payments by them to EPU, and the 
/consequent loss 
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consequent loss of a bargaining position facilitating their am 
exports to Latin America* This difficulty is met in part — but in 
part only — by provision 21 (b) above. 
e) Secondly, there will be difficulties from the European 
countries which are large dollar earners in Latin America, 
especially if the settlement of their Latin American surpluses 
via EFU brings them small dollar savings or dollar receipts in 
their settlements with EFU (i.e*, if their EFU deficits or 
. ' * » 
surpluses are settled largely through credit* rather than gold 
settlements). Again, this difficulty is met in part — but in 
part only by provision 21 (b) above« 
26. The tables presented in the Annexes illustrate the practical working of 
our proposals. It must be noted, however, that they are based exclusively 
on trade balances, since bilateral data on invisible transactions and 
capital movements are available only to the central banks concerned» The 
inclusion of these transactions would modify substantially our results, and 
would particularly decrease the amount of residual, uncompensated, Latin 
American claims on Europe. 
The.tables, moreover, do not take into account the further compensations 
which could be effected by transfers of EFU accounts among the Latin American 
countries themselves. Such transfers would also tend to reduce both the . 
uncompensated Latin American balances and the gold payments to be made to 
EFU. 
Finally, the figures used bear little relationship to the current 
situation. The position of' many Latin American countries particularly 
Brazil and Argentina — vis-a-vis their European partners deteriorated 
greatly in 1952, and most of them were during that year in substantial 
deficit — rather than surplus — in their European accounts. 
For these reasons, the figures used in Annex I and those quoted in the 
text itself should not be regarded in any way as indicative of the probable 
results of a compensation system. Their only purpose is to illustrate the 
mechanical steps involved in the proposal. From this point of view, other 
and purely hypothetical, figures could serve as well. In any case, we 
/should insist 
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should insist again that the full potentialities of a transferable payments 
mechanism.cannot be gauged from the actual trade pattern emerging under the 
shackles of a bilateral system of settlements. Indeed, thè very purpose of 
our proposals would be to modify the present trade pattern and allow it to 
develop in freer and more multilateral fash ion. Actual compensations would 
grow in volume as countries are encouraged to let their exports and imports 
develop along their most normal and economical channels, with the assurance 
that exports to' any country can be used to pay for imports from any other 
country in the system. 
27. If all Latin American countries and all EPU countries joined an 
agreement, compensations of balances would have cleared $170 million of 
surpluses and, of course, an equal amount of deficits* Gold payments would 
have amounted to $68 millions, i«e#, 20 per cent of the total compensations, 
or 28 per cent of the- total debt reductions of $238 million. 
The claims of EPU debtors on Latin American countries would have been 
reduced by $42 million, improving correspondingly their EPU position. On 
the other hand, their debts to Latin American countries would have been 
reduced by $57 million, involving a corresponding increase in their deficits 
within EPU. This net deterioration of $15 million would have required 
minimum gold payments of $5 million to EPU under rule 21 (b) above, but 
probably more insofar as the increases and decreases affected different 
countries in the group. 
The EPU creditors on the other hand would have reduced their Latin 
American debts and their European surpluses by about $113 million. On the 
other hand, the reduction of $195 million in their Latin American claims 
would have increased their European surpluses by an equivalent amount. If 
the same creditors were involved in both cases, net gold payments to them 
by EPU would have totalled $57 million (70 per cent of the net increase of 
$82 million in their EPU surpluses) and new credits by them to EPU of 
i>25 million (30 per cent of the net increase in their surplusés). On the 
other hand, if the increases and decreases had affected different countries 
in each case: 
/a) the total 
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a) the total decrease of $113 million in their surpluses would 
probably have been settled equally by gold repayments and credit 
amortization of $56«5 million each; 
b) the total increase of $195 million in their surpluses would have 
led to gold payments to them of $136 »5 million, and additional credits by 
them to EFU of $58,5 million. 
The exact effect of these operations on EFU*s convertible assets would 
vary greatly, depending on whether increases and decreases of positions 
affected the same, or different, countries. 
In the first case, gold payments to EFU by European debtors ($5 million), 
and by Latin American countries ($68 million) would have exceeded by $16 
million the gold payments by EFU to the creditors ($5? million). In the 
most unfavourable case, however, gold payments by EFU to the creditors 
($136.5 million) could theoretically exceed by $7 million the gold payments 
of $129.5 million made to EFU by other creditors ($56.5 million), by Latin 
American countries ($68 million), and by EFU debtors ($5 million). 
Such differences would have been readjusted under paragraph 21 (c) 
above so as to eliminate any lasting impact on EPU*s convertible assets. 
28. The great buUk: of compensations, in the example above, originates 
with Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela. These total $134 million 
in each direction, as against $35 million for all other countries taken 
together. The first three countries alone account for $116 million and 
are among those who may be most interested in participating in a clearing 
system within EFU. Moreover, the unavoidable improvement in the overall 
balance of payments of Brazil would open up additional opportunities for 
compensations on a very substantial scale. 
On the other hand, the very establishment of transferability would 
undoubtedly tend to facilitate imports — as well as exports — on the 
part of other countries, such as Cuba or Mexico for instance. The 
ultimate results of transferability cannot be gauged from the trade 
pattern associated with bilateralism and which the proposed reform is 
precisely designed to transform radically. 
29. It should finally be noted that of the European countries, the 




system such as outlined above» No great harm would result from this, 
however, if compensations involving sterling can be broadened through an 
expansion of transferable sterling facilities, along the lines suggested in 
paragraph 8. 
30, The International Monetary Fund could provide the most effective and 
logical link between EPU and the Latin American countries for the 
implementation of any arrangements along the lines suggested in this paper: 
a) as far as compensations proper are concerned, it is best 
able to provide the necessary technical assistance and facilities, 
since it includes representatives both from Latin American and from 
European countries; 
b) a more active use of the countries1 quqtas in the Fund would, 
greatly facilitate the settlement of both net surpluses and net 
deficits after compensation, and could also be substituted in 
part for the gold payments.suggested above; 
c) the Fund should retain responsibility for monetary co-operation 
between any regional organization, such as EPU, and the countries 
which are not members of such an organization. 
31» The suggestions presented in this paper with respect to Latin American 
transactions with EPU countries do not imply any.displacement of the Fund 
by EPU. They are based on the two following assumptions: 
a) the present inadequacy of the Fund and superiority of EPU ~ 
with respect to clearing transactions proper (see. paragraph 6 above),; 
b) the permanent unsuitability of EPU -— and superiority of the 
Fund —- with respect to all other aspects of EFU-Latin American 
monetary and exchange relationships. 
32» Clearing operations will facilitate triangular settlements and 
decrease correspondingly the bilateral pressures arising from the present 
system of monetary settlements. Even after full resort has been taken to 
such clearing opportunities, however, there will .remain residual surplus 
or deficit positions of a bilateral character. Settlement of such positions 
through the Fund may, in many cases, remain preferable to gold payments or 
to bilateral payment agreement credit. Some Latin American countries may 
also wish to resort, to Fund drawings to pay EPU creditor countries in order 
to avoid the fractional gold payments required under paragraph 20 (c) above. 
The question of standing the use of the Fund!s resources has long been 
/a matter 
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a matter of public discussion, and the Fund has taken certain steps in that 
direction. In view of the deficits recently accumulated by many Latin American 
countries in Europe, it might be pointed out that Latin American drawings of 
European currencies would, in many cases, result in a better balance in the 
Fund's holdings 'of member currencies. 
53« The active co-operation of the Fund in Latin American-EFU settlements 
might create additional incentives for full participation of Latin American 
countries in the Fund. 
IV. Summary of Conclusions 
34. Trade between Europe and Latin America is susceptible of considerable 
expansion if transferability can be substituted for the present bilateralism 
of settlements. 
35. The most radical and desirable solution of the problem, pending a 
general return to full convertibility, would be the automatic mobilization 
through the IMF of a country's earnings in any currencies —• except that of 
an extreme debtor — against any other currencies needed to settle its . 
bilateral deficits except the currency of an extreme creditor. Beyond 
this, the Fund would of course continue to finance, on a non-automatic basis, 
net deficits of a temporary character. 
Such a solution, however, requires extensive modifications in present 
Fund policies and is likely to involve difficult and protracted negotiations 
among its members. Gradual progress toward it may be initiated along the 
lines indicated below. 
36* As far as sterling is concerned, Latin American countries should 
consider the possibility of joining the transferable account area, particularly 
if arrangements can be made to ensure automatic transferability with those 
EFU countries which have remained so far outside this area. 
37. Automatic transferability via EFU itself might best be negotiated along 
the following general lines$ 
a) the right for any Latin American country to compensate its 
deficits with some EFU members against its earnings on other EFU members; 
b) this should b§ acceptable to EFU members, on a pure compensation 
basis, with no gold settlements, as long as the compensations do not increase 




country could, on that basis, effect via EHJ all settlements of its deficits 
toward EFU debtors, and of its surpluses toward EPU creditors» 
The settlement of deficits toward EFU creditors, and of surpluses 
toward EPU debtors should also be- acceptable: 
(1) if it merely reverses previous operations of the 
same Latin American country with the same European countries; 
(2) if transfers of balances between Latin American 
countries can be arranged, permitting similar reversal 
operations between different Latin American countries and 
the same European countries. 
c) operations involving a net increase in the imbalance of a European 
member in EPU could hardly be channelled through the regular quota machinery 
of EPU, They might, however, be feasible if the resulting gold settlements 
by EPU debtors remain on a moderate scale (let us say 30 or 35 per cent), 
and the resulting credit extensions by EPU creditors remain also on a 
moderate scale (let us say 25 or 30 per cent). To make this possible, it 
is suggested that fractional gold payments of 25 per cent be made by Latin 
American countries: 
(1) when using earnings on an EPU debtor to acquire 
transferable EPU balances; and 
(2) when using such transferable balances to p^ r an 
EPU creditor. 
38. Latin American countries might wish to examine the current and 
prospective pattern of their bilateral payments position with OEEC member 
countries, in order to determine, in the light of the above analysis, 
whether EPU transferability would contribute substantially to the removal 
of present bilateral obstacles to a freer flow of trade and to the attainment 
of overall equilibrium in their international transactions. 
/Annex I 
E/CN.12/299 
Page 27 ; : i 
Annex I 
Bilateral Trade Balances of Major Latin America Countries in 1951 
(in millions of Ue S« Dollars) 
A 
W i t h E p: U- c r e d i t o r c o u n t r i e s 









Argentina -10 457 -52 -6 417 410 484 -68 416 
Uruguay -2 -4 -3 4-7 -15 4-1 48 -24 -16 









492 -196 416 
-120 
Peru 48 41 -3 4-5 -2 4*6 4-20 -5 +15 
Chile 42 412 42 '-1 -3 40.3 416.3 -4 *12,3 
Bolivia -1 -1 -0.4 42 40 »1 42.1 - 2 . 4 -O .3 
Ecuador +1 41 -1 40.2 - 2 - 0 . 2 •R2.2 -3.2 -1.0 
Colombia -11 -3 ' 4-1 -5 -5 42 43 - 2 4 -21 
Subtotals 4-11 






-6 - 1 2 
48.4 
- 0 . 2 
4-43« 6 -38.6 427.3 
-22.3, 
Venezuela -6 -1 414 -5 -9 4-4 +18 -21 -3 
Mexico +8 43 42 -1 44 4-1 418 -1 4-17 
Cuba -4 4-1 -4 40.2 421 436 ' 458.2 -8 4 5 0 . 2 



























4239.8 -266.6 4118.5 
-145.3 






W i t h E P U D e b t o r c o u n t r i e s 
Total Total m x n 






Argentina -1 +2 +160 . -7 +162 •-8 +154 
Uruguay +0.1 +0.3 +12 -7 +12.4 -7 +5.4 
Brazil -4 +7 + 3 0 +37 -4 +33 
Subtotals +0.1 +9.3 +202 




Peru -1 +0.1 +45 +4 +49.1 -1 +48.1 
Chile -1 -1 +2 +13 +15 -2 +13 
Bolivia -0.1 +42 -0.1 +42 -0.2 +41.8' 
Ecuador -4 +0.4 • +0.4 -4 -3.6 









+113.5 -26.2 +102.9 
- 1 5 . 6 
Venezuela +3 -2 +7 +22 +32 -2 +30 
Mexico +1 +1 +31 +21 +54 +54 
Cuba -1 -1 +115 +7 +122 -2 +120 










Totalj gross +4..1 







+594.9 -50.2 +560.3 
-15.6 
Total, net -5.4 +5.4 . +485. +59.3 +544.7 
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With all E P U countries reported 
Total surpluses Total deficits Net 4 
Argentina •f246 -76 +170 
Uruguay- 4-20.4 -31 -10.6 
Brazil 437 -108 -71 
Subtotals 4303«4 -215 4170 
-81.6 
Peru 469.1 -6 463.1 
Chile . 4 3 1 . 3 -6 425.3 
Bolivia 4 4 4 . 1 -2o6 -r/jl* 5 
Ecuador 4-2.6 -7.2 —4«6 
Colombia 4-10 -43 -33 
Subtotals 4-157.1 - 6 4 . 8 + 1 2 9 . 9 
-37.6 
Venezuela 450 -23 +27 
Mexico 472 -1 471 
Cuba 4-180.2 -10 +170.2 
Dom« Rep» 472 -3 +69 
Subtotals +374.2 -37 4 3 3 7 . 2 
Total, gross • 4334.7 -316.8 4 6 3 7 . 1 
- 1 1 9 . 2 
Total, net 4 5 1 7 . 9 
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Annex II 
Settlements of Deficits 
(in millions of U. .Se dollars) 
Latin American Deficits .toward EPU Debtors 




• 100% by 
claims on 
creditors 
F r a c t i o 
75% by • 
claims on 
debtors 
n a 1 
2% by 
gold 
Argentina 8 ' 8 - - -
Uruguay 7 7 — M* 
Brazil 4 3 1 
Subtotal 19 15 3 1 
Peru 1 1 - - -
Chile 2 2 - -
Bolivia 0*2 0°2 - - -
Ecuador 4 2.2 C»4 0.13 1.27 
Colombia . 19 3 7 2.-33 6,67 
Subtotal 26.2 8 . 4 7-4 2.46 7.94 
Venezuela 2 2 - - -
Mexico - - — -
Cuba • 2 2 - - — 
Dora» Rep. 1 1 
Subtotal 5 5 - - -
Total 50.2 23.4 IO.4 • 3.46 ' 7.94 
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Annex II (continued.) 
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Annex III 
Summary of Compensations effected in Annex II 
(in millions of U. 
A. Debts 
S. dollars) 
Total Residual D e b t R e d u c t i 0 n 




Argentina 76 - 76 59 17 _ 
Uruguay 31 0.71 30.29 20.4 9»89 
Brazil 108 43.56 64.44 ' 37 27 »44 
Subtotal • 215 44.27 170.73 116 .4 54.33 
Peru • 6 - 6 4.75 1.25 
Chile 6 — 6 5 1 
Bolivia 2s 6 2.6 2 .0.6 
Ecuador 7«2 4.47 2.73 2.6 0.13 
Colombia .43 . . 30.67 12,33 10 2.33 
Subtotal 64.8 35.14 29.66 24.35 5.31' 
Venezuela 23 - 23 17.75 5.25 
Mexico 1 — 1 0.75 0.25 
Cuba 10 - 10 8 2 
Bom« Rep» 3 — . 3 2.5- 0.5 
Subtotal 37 - 37 29 8 
"Total"-"'; 79.41 237.39 ' 169.75. 6 7 . 6 4 







Claims of Claims 
Compen-
sations 
Argentina 246 187 59 118 
Uruguay- 20.4 - 20.4 40.8 
Brazil 37 _ 37 74 
Subtotal 303.4 187 116.4 232.8 
Peru 69.1 64.35 4.75 9.50 
Chile 31.3 26.3 5 10 
Bolivia 44.1 42.1 2 4 
Ecuador 2.6 - 2.6 5.2 
Colombia 10. _ 10 20 
Subtotal 157.1 132.75 24.35 48.70 
Venezuela 50 32.25 17.75 35.50 
Mexico 72 71.25 0.75 1.50 
Cuba 180.2 172.2 8 16 
Dom. Rep. 72. 69.5 2„5 5 
Subtotal 374.2 345.20 29 58 
Total 834.7 664.95 169.75 339o50 
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Annex III (continued) 
C« Effect on EPU members 
Readjusting: Reductions of Maladjusting: Reductions oi 
Claims on Debts to Debts to Claims on 
Creditors debtors Creditors Debtors 
Argentina 59 8 68 -
Uruguay 8 7 23.29 12.4 
Brazil 4 60.44 37 
Subtotal 67 19 151.73 49.4 
Peru 4.75 1 5 -
Chile 5 • 2 4 — 
Bolivia 2 0.2 2.4 — 
Ecuador 2.2 2.73 — 0 . 4 
Colombia 3 12.33 _ 7. 
Subtotal 16.95 13.26 11.4 7.4 
Venezuela 17.75 2 21' — 
Mexico 0.75 — 1 — 
Cuba 8 2 8 — 
Dom® Rep» 2.5 1 2 — 
Subtotal 29 5 • 32 -
Total 112.95 42.26 195.13 56.8 
